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Legal Regulation of Addictive Substances and Addiction
Abstract
The law regulates addiction in two primary ways: by limiting access to controlled substances and by
criminal and civil law doctrines pertaining to addicts. This chapter first addresses the basic definitional
and conceptual issues concerning addiction. Then it turns to the justification of substance regulation in
the USA and public policy issues. It suggests that the right to use substances recreationally, even at the
risk of negative consequences such as addiction, is weighty and that regulation of substances and
addiction-related behavior by criminal law is problematic. Next, it considers whether addiction should be a
mitigating or excusing condition for crime and whether addicts can be involuntarily civilly committed. It
describes the current state of the law and proposes that, in most cases, addiction should not excuse
criminal offending and addicts should not be civilly committed. A final section considers social and
criminal justice policies that could alleviate the costs of addiction.
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INTRODUCTION
The law regulates addiction in two primary ways: by limiting access
to controlled substances and by criminal and civil law doctrines that
pertain to addicts. The general ability of the state to legally regulate
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potentially harmful commodities and behaviors, including by criminal
law prohibitions and punishment, is an unquestionably justifiable exercise of its police power authority to act for the benefit of public health,
safety and welfare. The public policy issues are whether legal regulation
is wise in a specific context and whether it may conflict with individual
rights.
This chapter first addresses the basic definitional and conceptual
issues concerning addiction that must be clarified to make progress.
Then it turns to the justification of substance regulation in the USA and
to the public policy issues themselves. The author suggests that the right
to use substances recreationally, even at the risk of severe negative consequences such as addiction, is weighty and that regulation of substances
and addiction-related behavior by the criminal law is problematic. Next,
the chapter considers whether addiction should be a mitigating or excusing condition for crime and whether addicts can be involuntarily civilly
committed. The current state of the law is described and it is proposed
that, in most cases, addiction should not mitigate or excuse criminal
offending and that addicts should not be civilly committed. A final section briefly considers sensible social and criminal justice policies that
could alleviate the costs of addiction, even if society does not decriminalize drugs or excuse addicts.

CLARIFICATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT
DRUGS AND ADDICTION
Virtually every statement that can be made about drugs and addiction, whether it is factual or normative, is contestable. In this section, the
author will try to remain as neutral as possible.
Despite common belief to the contrary, there is no consensual definition either of a drug, which is the most common cause of an addiction,
or of addiction, but clarity about both is necessary to discuss legal regulation sensibly. Let us start with the definition of a drug or a substance.
Virtually all definitions are vague or overinclusive, permitting categorization as a drug of almost any substance that may be consumed. Some
definitions are circularly dependent on legal regulations. If a law regulating “drugs” includes a particular substance within its ambit, it is a drug
or a “controlled substance”, that is, a substance that cannot be consumed
except under limited conditions such as a physician’s prescription (Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 2010, Section 802(6)). If it is not so
included, it is not a drug for legal purposes. Vague, overinclusive and
circular definitions cannot sensibly guide public policy, especially when
the state’s awesome power to blame and punish for illegitimate use is
dependent on the definition.
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Definitional problems concerning drugs and regulation cannot be
entirely avoided by using allegedly scientific or value-neutral medical/
therapeutic or nutritional concepts. Concepts such as disease and therapy are themselves value laden and inevitably problematic and controversial. Many substances that have unquestionably legitimate medical
or nutritional uses can also be used for non-medical or non-nutritional
purposes that may be of questionable legitimacy. Finally, definitions that
define a substance as a drug in terms of its intended use rather than in
terms of its inherent properties obscure important questions of legitimate
use.
Despite the conceptual problems attending the definition of a drug, a
loose but common-sense definition is possible for discussing addiction
and regulation. This common-sense definition would be substances that
can be consumed recreationally, that is, primarily to produce pleasure,
whether or not those substances have other legitimate uses. For the purpose of understanding the current debate about addiction and regulation, recreational drugs can be defined as consumable substances that: (1)
can affect mood, cognition and behavior in pleasurable ways; (2) can be
used primarily for recreation, including relaxation, excitement and pleasurable states generally; and (3) can be used so as to endanger the user
and others. Although admittedly loose, this definition covers both legal
recreational substances, such as ethanol (alcohol), nicotine and caffeine,
and substances that are illegal either per se or if they are not properly
prescribed by physicians, such as marijuana, cocaine, opiates, e.g., heroin, barbiturates, amphetamines, phencyclidine (PCP), and the like. Let
us defer the definition of an addictive drug until we have considered the
nature of addiction.
The primary criteria of addiction commonly employed at present are
behavioral, namely, persistent drug seeking and using, especially compulsively, in the face of negative consequences (Morse, 2009). The neural
mechanisms of addiction are debatable, but are being intensively investigated and will probably be uncovered (Hyman, 2007), and environmental variables play an important role in explaining addictive behavior
(Kalant, 2010).
The most important terms for legal purposes are “compulsive” and
“negative consequences”. There is no gold-standard definition of or psychological or biological test for compulsivity, which also must be demonstrated behaviorally. There are extremely suggestive laboratory findings,
especially with non-human animals (e.g. Everitt & Robbins, 2005), but
none is yet diagnostic for humans. The usual behavioral criteria for compulsion are both subjective and objective. Addicts commonly report feelings of craving or that they have lost control or cannot help themselves.
If the agent persists in seeking and using despite ruinous medical, social
and legal consequences, and despite an alleged desire to stop, we infer
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based on common sense that the person must be acting under compulsion. It seems that there is no other way to explain the behavior, but it
is not based on rigorous tests of a well-validated concept. Negative consequences, both internalities and externalities, are not necessarily part of
the definition of addiction because, depending on the circumstances, it is
possible to be a highly functioning addict who does not suffer or impose
substantial negative consequences. Contingent social norms and expectations play a role in explaining how negative the consequences must be,
but addiction often has severely negative consequences (e.g. overdose,
cancer, psychosis), independent of social norms and expectations.
There are many findings about the biology and psychology of addicts
that differentiate this group from non-addicts, but none of these findings is independently diagnostic. Addiction must be demonstrated
behaviorally. Although the characterization of addiction as a “chronic
and relapsing brain disease” is widely used today, it is not justified by
the data (Heyman, 2009). Brain causation and brain differences do not
per se make associated behaviors the signs or symptoms of a disease.
All behavior has brain causes and one would expect brain differences
between any two groups exhibiting different behaviors. Moreover, the
relapse data were not gathered on random samples of addicts, and characterizing a return to maladaptive behavior as a “relapse” begs the question of whether the behavior is the sign or a symptom of a disease. The
latter must be proven independently (Fingarette & Hasse, 1979). Whether
addiction should be considered a disease, a moral failure, or sometimes
both, is still an open question. Even if addicts have difficulty controlling
their behavior, they are not zombies or automatons; they act intentionally to satisfy their desire to seek and to use drugs (Hyman, 2007; Morse,
2000, 2007, 2009).
Using the definition just provided, an addictive drug would be one
that has a substantial potential to cause users to persistently seek and
use the substance, especially compulsively and with negative consequences. Most users of even the most allegedly addictive substances do
not become addicts, but some substances increase the risk. And, as noted,
whether one moves from casual recreational use or medical use to addiction is influenced by the agent’s set (psychological expectations) and by
the setting (the environment and its cues) (Zinberg, 1986). The substance
itself does not account for all the variance in explaining addiction. We
would like to think, and it is probably true, that some substances are particularly addictive, holding the agent’s set and setting constant, but it is
extremely difficult empirically to disentangle these causal variables.
A fascinating, fraught question is whether addiction should be limited to substances. After all, large numbers of people engage persistently
and apparently compulsively in various activities, often at quite negative
costs. Gambling is the most obvious example. If there are some activities
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or non-drug substances that can produce the same “addictive behavior”
and negative consequences as drugs, then legal regulation should perhaps be similar by analogy. The author believes for many reasons that
the concept of addiction should be expanded beyond drugs, but the analysis in this chapter will be confined to drug-related addictions.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR LEGAL REGULATION: THE
HARM PRINCIPLE AND ITS LIMITS
The general justification for the legal regulation of addictive substances is best summed up in the preamble to the Federal Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act:
The Congress makes the following findings and declarations:
(1) Many of the drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people.
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and
improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect
on the health and general welfare of the American people. (2010, Sections
801(1) & (2)).
Just so. Who would deny that drugs can have beneficial effects, that
some recreational (and medical) drug use leads to addiction, and that
addicts often harm themselves and others? Even those recreational,
“uncontrolled” addictive drugs that are legal to import, manufacture,
distribute, possess, and use, such as nicotine and ethanol, are heavily regulated and violations of those regulations are often criminalized.
Few people object to civil regulation of potentially dangerous substances,
such as laws concerning safe manufacture, taxation and public use. The
real debate among all but the most libertarian theorists is therefore about
the use of criminal law to prevent people from having unauthorized
access to controlled substances (Husak, 2008). Therefore, this discussion
will be limited to that topic, although it is clear that both nicotine and
ethanol use create vast internalities and externalities.
The state’s police power to apprehend, prosecute, convict and punish
citizens is the most awesome and afflictive power it exercises. Infliction
of such pain requires substantial justification in liberal democracies that
seek to protect individual rights and liberty. Afflictive and expensive
criminal regulation should be avoided in favor of less intrusive means
unless the harm is great, punishment would be deserved for causing it,
and criminal prohibition seems necessary to reduce the level of harm
and will not unduly impose on other important interests. Criminal law
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theorists term these limitations on the state’s power to criminalize the
“harm principle” (Feinberg, 1984). For example, intentionally inflicting
emotional cruelty on others is morally despicable, but such behavior is
not criminalized because the harm is insufficient to justify criminal punishment. Socialization by families, religious organizations and schools is
reasonably effective to limit such conduct, and regulating such behavior
by criminal law might intrude on protected liberties, such as the right to
free speech.
There is little debate about the state’s justification for prohibiting and
punishing traditional crimes against the person, such as homicide and
forcible rape, and against property, such as theft and arson, that cause
grievous harm. Although individual liberties are precious, no citizen
has a right to kill, rape, steal or burn the property of others for private
advantage, and the criminal sanction seems morally appropriate and
necessary to curb such behavior. Societies can disagree about the scope of
appropriate criminalization. For example, there may be reasonable dispute about how much creation of homicidal risk should be necessary to
warrant criminal penalties in addition to civil damages or how severely
arson should be punished, but the state’s power to criminalize great
harm to others is uncontroversial.
The harm principle suggests caution before criminalization, however,
under the following conditions: when the harm is primarily inflicted on
oneself; when the harm is primarily moral and not physical, psychological or economic; when using criminal law to prevent the harm appears to
intrude on important rights; or when criminalization appears unnecessary to effectively reduce the harmful behavior. In liberal societies, the
right of the state to criminally prohibit actions that harm primarily the
actor (so-called legal paternalism or legal moralism) is more controversial than the right to prohibit harm to others. Respect for individual liberty and autonomy generally entails that citizens have greater liberty to
harm themselves than to harm others (Feinberg, 1986, 1988). Such liberty
is arguably most extensive and the state’s right to regulate criminally
most questionable when the threatened harm to self is apparently solely
moral and no other harm to self or to others can be discerned. Most liberal theorists reject the state’s power to use criminal law solely for the
purpose of enhancing the moral perfection of its citizens. Such goals are
arguably not the business of the state and should be achieved by other,
less intrusive means.
Even within liberal regimes, the permissible scope of paternalism and
moralism may vary, although both require more substantial justification
than criminalizing harm to others. Consideration of the state’s justifiable use of criminal law to regulate recreational drug use because it may
lead to addiction, however, must attend to the appropriate limits of state
power within a particular political regime. The remainder of this chapter
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assumes that the regime considering its policies concerning drugs and
addiction is liberal.

DRUG USE AND RIGHTS
It is often assumed that there is no right, no liberty interest to use
drugs recreationally, and, consequently, that the state has appropriate
authority to use criminal law to prevent such use. Such an assumption
is seldom supported with cogent argument, however, and it is not easy
to give compelling moral and political reasons for rejecting such a right,
even if exercise of that right may sometimes lead to ruinous addiction
(Husak, 1992).
Sensible discussion must begin with the recognition that people take
drugs recreationally because they desire the pleasurable effects produced
by consuming substances that alter mood and cognition. It seems clear,
however, that the state has no justifiable interest in criminal prohibition
simply because the primary or even sole goal of behavior is pleasure or
because the behavior involves consumption of a substance that can alter
mood or cognition. Many people might consider it wrong to engage in
activities solely for pleasure, especially if alteration of mood and cognition were involved and there were some danger of dependence on the
activity, but a liberal society does not interfere with a citizen’s right to
make autonomous choices to engage in such potentially dangerous activities. Citizens surely have a prima facie right to seek pleasure for its own
sake, and it is very difficult to imagine a secular, liberal argument suggesting that such a goal is immoral or harmful per se, even if some danger might sometimes be involved.
For example, suppose that a citizen engages in meditation solely for
recreational purposes. No persuasive liberal moral or political theory
would justify criminal prohibition of meditation, even if some citizens
became dependent on meditating. Recreational drug use involves the
consumption of a substance, but it is hard to imagine why the source of
the recreation alone should make a difference. Currently illegal drugs
produce pleasure by altering mood and cognition, but so do many legal
activities, including meditation, mountain climbing, riding motorcycles,
playing bridge, and the consumption of legal drugs such as caffeine, ethanol and nicotine. The state’s right to criminalize alterations of mood and
cognition per se is questionable because such alterations are not per se
immoral or harmful.
Citizens appear to have a prima facie right to engage in recreational
alteration of mood and cognition by drug consumption and the state
surely has the burden of justifying criminal prohibition of such recreation
by powerful arguments. No right is absolute, however, and the possible
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right to pursue recreational drug use must yield to a powerful state interest in preventing such use, especially the undoubted state interest in curtailing the threat that drugs will cause substantial harm by producing
addiction, drug-related harms and their associated costs. Nonetheless,
harm limitation counsels caution before using the criminal law.
Illegal drug use is often considered a “crime without a victim”
because the person potentially most harmed—the user—in effect consents to the threat. Indeed, virtually no recreational user, including those
who begin use in adolescence, is unaware of the risk of addiction. Of
course, younger people often tend to be foolish risk takers who do not
sufficiently appreciate potential dangers and anyone can be in denial
about the risks to him or herself. However, everyone is at least intellectually aware of the risk that use may lead to addiction and that virtually no action affects only the agent. As a result of its effect on mental
states and of its potential to produce addiction, recreational drug use
sometimes threatens families and communities with economic, psychological and physical harms. Many of these harms may be paradoxically
produced or enhanced by criminal prohibition itself, but many surely are
not. Moreover, harms one consents to suffer are nonetheless harms. The
question is whether the harms to others or to self that drugs produce are
sufficient to trump the individual’s prima facie right to use drugs and
thus to warrant criminalization of drug use.
The next section on cost–benefit analysis considers the harms drugs
produce, but liberal societies often permit dangerous behavior in order
to protect the right of citizens to pursue their own visions of how life
should be led. Such dangerous behavior is regulated non-criminally,
if at all. For example, consider the immense costs to many users and to
society at large that flow from the consumption of ethanol and nicotine.
Again, the state can appropriately regulate many aspects of such substance consumption to reduce the consequent harms, including the use
of criminal law for egregiously harmful forms of misuse, such as drunkdriving. For many reasons, however, importantly including the right
to make one’s own choices unencumbered by undue state interference,
criminal prohibition of the consumption of ethanol and nicotine by the
state is considered unwarranted and the attempt to prohibit the former
in the USA was a failed social policy, although it admittedly produced
some health benefits.
If drugs produce great harms and no one has a right to use drugs recreationally, or if that right is insubstantial at best, then the only question
for analysis is whether criminal regulation is justified by the benefits
it achieves. However, if there is a weighty liberty interest in making
choices about how to live one’s life, including potentially unwise and
dangerous choices about drugs, then the potential creation of harm is
insufficient per se to warrant criminalization. Some dangerous behaviors
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must be permitted to protect liberty and must be regulated primarily civilly, including money damages and other impositions when addiction
produces externalities. Any adequate analysis of the regulation of drug
use by criminal law must therefore include consideration of the strength
of the liberty interest, and it appears that in liberal societies, the right is
substantial. Empirical analysis of the consequences of various behaviors
under various regulatory regimes is necessary to inform decisions about
the appropriate scope of criminalization and decriminalization of drugs,
but the question of rights cannot be avoided.

COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL
REGULATION OF DRUG USE
This section of the article is a composite drawn from a number of leading commentators. For those who oppose decriminalization, see Falco
(1992), Jacobs (1990) and Wilson (1990). For those who propose decriminalization, see Nadelmann (1989), Husak (2002) and Global Commission
on Drug Policy (2011). For non-partisan analyses that reach different conclusions, see Husak (1992), Kleiman (1992), MacCoun and Reuter (2001),
Moore (1991) and Zimring and Hawkins (1992).
The outcome of criminal justice regulation of drug use will be indeterminate because many of the data are unavailable or unreliable, or
fluctuate, and because the costs and benefits of an alternative regime
are speculative. Also, historical and cross-cultural comparisons are
of extremely limited value because social variables, which vary radically intertemporally within a society and across different societies,
immensely affect the consequences of drug use and regulation. The rest
of this section raises a number of issues, but readers should recognize
that this is an intensely complicated issue and that this chapter can only
touch on some of the considerations.

Harms from Drugs and the Benefits of Criminalization
Much debate about criminal regulation mistakes the probability and
extent of the risks drugs pose. For example, most people who use most
drugs recreationally do not become addicted and the moderate recreational use of drugs is not per se dangerous if the drug is pure and
properly consumed. Nonetheless, the ease of access to drugs following
decriminalization would surely increase the prevalence of use, abuse
and addiction, and their further harmful consequences. The harms might
be especially great in poorer and minority communities, where the prevalence of drug use is no higher than in other communities, but where the
effects have been more devastating. Some responsible observers believe
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that decriminalization may effectively destroy poorer and minority communities already ravaged by drug abuse and addiction.
The relation between drug addiction and other criminal activity and
health harms is fraught because it is difficult to disentangle the effects
of criminalization itself from the independent effects of drug use. Some
drugs, especially if used heavily, can substantially impair judgment,
facilitate impulsivity and have other effects that increase the risk of criminal offending and other dangerous behavior, such as careless driving,
sharing needles for intravenous injection and unprotected sex. Increased
drug use, especially heavy use and addiction, will raise the rates of such
undesirable behavior.
Criminalization of drugs inhibits use generally and consequent addiction by making production, sale, possession and use more expensive and
dangerous and by sending the clearest possible message that drug use is
wrong. For example, there might have been both rights-based and consequential reasons to repeal Prohibition in the USA, but the data suggest
that consumption and addiction-related diseases such as cirrhosis of the
liver both decreased when most alcohol production and sale were illegal. Criminalization also helps to prevent drug use by minors. Although
minors regrettably have access to and consume drugs in a regime of
criminalization, ease of access generally would also increase use, as
would potential addiction among minors who are already developmentally predisposed to take unwarranted risks.
The use of criminal law to regulate drug use and addiction is obviously not fully successful by any standard and it is immensely expensive, but the proponents of continued criminalization argue that
the current regime provides greater benefits than costs and that the
unknown benefits, if any, of decriminalization would pale in comparison
to the costs of inevitably increased use and abuse.

The Costs of Criminalization
Criminal law enforcement, including imprisonment, is an especially
intrusive and expensive form of regulation of any behavior. The cost–
benefit critique of criminalization argues that such costs are not outweighed by the benefits because criminal law makes only a small dent in
the use of drugs and because criminalization itself creates avoidable harms.
The attempt to eradicate drug use by criminal prohibition cannot fully
succeed because large numbers of people want recreational drugs for
the pleasure or relief they provide, and it is widely recognized that the
dangers of drugs are sometimes exaggerated. Given the powerful factors
that motivate the desire for drugs, the criminal sanction appears ineffective. The criminal justice system cannot prosecute and imprison more
than a tiny fraction of the enormous numbers of people involved in the
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illegal drug trade unless the justice system massively diverts resources
from other, undisputed criminal law needs and abandons civil liberties
protections. The criminal courts of the USA are already clogged with
drug cases. It is hard to enforce laws that such large numbers of people
wish to violate and that often have no immediate or complaining victim. Furthermore, public hypocrisy about drugs inevitably undermines
law enforcement. Western society is not nearly as monolithically antidrug as many claim, as public policy toward ethanol and nicotine indicates. Even spending vastly more money seemingly will provide only
limited benefit. Fluctuations in drug usage appear far more related to
major social, cultural and economic forces than to criminal law enforcement. Despite billions spent on drug enforcement each year, undoubted
law enforcement successes and the huge numbers of people in prison for
drug-related offenses, drugs are still freely available, and in many cases
increasingly stronger and cheaper. Of course, the latter observations are
open to the interpretation that criminalization is succeeding and forcing
dealers to offer better product more cheaply.
Criminalization also threatens its own effectiveness and creates other
problems. For example, criminal prohibitions raise the price on a good
or service: the so-called “crime tariff”. This ensures that there will be an
endless supply of producers and dealers who seek to realize their profits by any means necessary, including violence, and that many users,
especially addicts, will be impoverished and driven to a life of further
crime simply to support themselves and to obtain drugs. The immense
profits facilitate the growth and power of domestic and international
organized crime and can be used to corrupt law enforcement and politicians. Criminalization decreases the probability that drug consumption
will occur under conditions safest to health. Finally, primary emphasis
on criminal law virtually ensures that fewer resources will be devoted
to investigating and implementing less intrusive and potentially more
effective means to reduce the prevalence of addiction and the other
harms it causes.

The Benefits of Decriminalization
Specific decriminalization proposals would produce different benefits, but the potential benefits of decriminalization are the opposites of
the costs of criminalization. They include an increase in personal liberty;
probable law enforcement cost savings; decrease in the crime, violence
and corruption that criminalization produces; increased respect for law
enforcement; and increased attention to possibly more effective means,
such as education, treatment and civil regulation, to reduce use and consequent addiction and its related harms. However, the relation between
drug use and criminal activity is extremely complicated. For example,
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drug use has not abated in recent years in the USA, but crime rates,
especially violent crime rates, have fallen substantially. Nevertheless,
criminalization produces a significant amount of criminal activity by definition and as a consequence. In a regime of decriminalization, criminal
law would be used only to prohibit particularly dangerous drug-related
activities such as drugged-driving or selling to minors. Such traditional
use of the criminal law would receive broad public support.
In the past few decades, there has been a vigorous debate in the
USA and Western Europe about criminal law regulation of drug use.
Decriminalization has become a “respectable” position. For example, a
prestigious international group, the Global Commission on Drug Policy,
has issued a report calling for decriminalization (2011). Some countries
and localities have engaged in decriminalization experiments or regimes.
Nonetheless, criminalization is still the dominant form of regulation and
most countries spend far more on law enforcement aimed at preventing all drug use than they do on prevention and treatment programs for
drug abuse prevention and treatment.

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT
This section considers the criminal responsibility of addicts, diversion
from the criminal justice system to specialized drug courts of addicts
accused of non-violent crimes and involuntary civil commitment of
addicts.
In Robinson v. California (1962), the US Supreme Court held that it was
unconstitutional to convict and punish a person for being an addict.
The rationale was that addiction is simply a status, and it is not fair to
blame and punish people in the absence of a culpable act, a rationale
that applies to attempted criminalization of any status. In Powell v. Texas
(1968), the Supreme Court rejected a claim that, roughly, an alcoholic
is constitutionally entitled to a “lack of control” defense to disorderly
conduct in public as a result of alcoholism. In two later cases, the Court
held that states may constitutionally bar defendants from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxication (Montana v. Egelhoff, 1996) and
mental disorder (Clark v. Arizona, 2006) to negate the mental state criteria required by the definitions of crimes (mens rea), criteria that the
Constitution requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Supreme Court has never held that the defense of legal insanity is constitutionally required and it has upheld the constitutionality of
the narrowest possible insanity defense (Clark v. Arizona, 2006). In sum,
there are few constitutional limits on criminal responsibility and jurisdictions are free to adopt virtually any responsibility doctrines they wish,
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including those that may be more permissive than those the Supreme
Court has approved.
Although proponents have suggested that there ought to be an independent addiction defense to crime or that addiction should be a proper
basis for an insanity defense, courts and legislatures faced with such
claims have almost uniformly rejected them (e.g. United States v. Moore,
1973). Moreover, control tests for legal insanity, which are usually considered the most natural claim for excuse based on addiction, have been
exceedingly disfavored for many decades on the grounds that they are
poorly conceptualized and operationalized. In the USA, there is no
generic doctrine of mitigation available at trial that an addict might
employ. At most, sentencing judges with discretion to consider addiction for purposes of sentencing may do so, but addiction is a knife that
cuts both ways. It may seem either to reduce or to enhance culpability
depending on how addiction is viewed, and it may be a risk factor for
dangerousness (Monahan et al., 2001).
The unforgiving response of US criminal law that denies or limits an
excuse or mitigation for addiction may seem harsh, but there is justification for it. The criteria for crimes always require action and actions can
always be morally evaluated, even if an action is allegedly the sign or
symptom of a disorder. The generic excusing conditions in US criminal
law are lack of rational capacity and lack of control capacity. The question is whether criminal behavior motivated in whole or in part by addiction meets either condition. No criminal behavior, other than possession
or use itself, is a sign or symptom of the “disease” of addiction. Even if it
were, a genuine excusing condition, such as lack of rational capacity or
lack of control capacity, would have to be independently demonstrated.
Also, there is substantial dispute about whether addicts have diminished
culpability for their criminal conduct on rationality or control grounds,
especially for property crimes or crimes of violence that may be committed either to support an addict’s habit or as part of a general criminal
lifestyle associated with addiction. (For recent treatments, compare Levy,
2011, Morse, 2011, and Yaffe, 2011.) Moreover, addicts may be considered
responsible for failing to take steps, such as entering treatment programs,
that may prevent them from becoming less responsible. Finally, providing a defense to crime for addiction may establish perverse incentives
that encourage drug use, and may increase addiction-related offending.
Given the disputes about the nature of addiction and the proper
moral and legal response to it, limiting defenses based on addiction is
not an irrational legislative or judicial judgment. The author’s view is
that most addicts do not satisfy the excusing criteria and those who do
may be held diachronously responsible based on an earlier failure to
prevent their own condition of excuse. Nonetheless, even if addiction
should not be a defense, sensible criminal justice reforms and other social
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interventions involving drugs and addiction, to which the discussion
will return in the next section, would be wise and just social policy.
Many US jurisdictions have established specialized drug courts to which
addicts accused of non-violent crimes may be diverted in appropriate cases
(see generally, Nolan, 2002). The details vary but, in essence, the diverted
defendant must agree to treatment programs and to strict behavioral controls. If the addict successfully completes the program, the criminal charge
is typically dropped. If the addict fails, then prosecution resumes. These
courts are controversial on empirical and normative grounds. It is not clear
whether they are cost-effective in reducing recidivism and other harms
associated with addiction and there are questions about whether they are
sufficiently well-theorized and just (see Wild et al., this volume, Chapter 8).
Some jurisdictions permit traditional involuntary civil commitment
of addicts, but others have special forms of commitment for substance
abusers (Parry, 2010). The criteria and procedures for these two types of
commitment may differ, which the Supreme Court has ruled does not
necessarily offend equal protection if the jurisdiction has a justifiable
rationale for distinguishing addicts (Heller v. Doe, 1993). In many cases,
the criteria are similar, however, and require a finding that the substance
abuser is a danger to self or others or is gravely disabled. There are no
good data about how many people are civilly committed because they
are addicts, but the number is not likely to be large. On the other hand,
temporary protective custody for those who are incapacitated as a result
of addiction or substance abuse is apparently common.
The justification for these commitments is that the addict is not
responsible for being dangerous or gravely disabled, a rationale in some
tension with the criminal law’s refusal to recognize non-responsibility
based on substance abuse or addiction. Responsibility standards in the
criminal and civil justice systems need not be the same because the two
systems do not have the same goals. Nonetheless, criminal blame and
punishment is the most severe infliction the state can impose on citizens
and one would think the state would be more forgiving about responsibility in such cases than in the case of a person who has committed no
crime and would like to be at liberty. As argued in the next section, provision of adequate treatment in the community rather than involuntary
civil commitment is the wiser course to deal with addiction.

LEGAL REFORMS TO MINIMIZE COSTS ASSOCIATED
WITH ADDICTION
Even if the view is correct that most addicts most of the time can fairly
be held responsible for the crimes they commit, including those such as
buying and possessing controlled substances that are central criteria for
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their disorder, it does not follow that the criminal justice policies our society pursues toward addicts and other users is wise. Indeed, the author
firmly believes that society should decriminalize purchase and possession
for personal use and use itself (Morse, 2009). Political liberalism and public health considerations suggest that criminal justice is not the optimum
or even a sensible means to address these phenomena. Indeed, using
criminal justice in such cases may be simply cruel. Moreover, doctrines
of mitigation should be expanded to cover some cases when addicts commit other crimes that are not a part of personal use itself (Morse, 2003).
Vastly more treatment ought to be available to those addicts who would
benefit, including reducing their risk of criminal behavior. This would be
cost-effective in itself and certainly more cost-effective and less liberty
depriving than involuntary civil commitment. Further, it would not be
unconstitutional or unwise to make entering a treatment program a condition for probation or parole or for more lenient conditions in prison. If
these and similar policies were adopted, it is likely that the personal and
social costs of addiction and substance abuse would decrease markedly
and criminal justice would operate more fairly.

CONCLUSION
Whether and how potentially addictive substances should be legally
regulated, especially by criminal law, are complicated, fraught questions
that involve considerations of individual rights and issues of public health
and welfare. Whether addiction should be a defense to crime and whether
addicts should be subject to involuntary civil commitment are equally difficult issues. Many debatable and reasonable choices for public policy are possible, but some reforms would do much to ease the burdens on individuals
and communities that current criminal and civil law regulation impose.

Acknowledgments
I thank Ed Greenlee for his invaluable help. As always, I thank my
personal attorney, Jean Avnet Morse, for her sound, sober counsel and
moral support.

References
Clark v. Arizona. (2006). 548 U.S. 735.
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. (2010). 21 U.S. Code, Chapter 13.
Everitt, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2005). Neural systems of reinforcement for drug addiction:
From actions to habits to compulsion. Nature Neuroscience, 8, 1481–1489.
Falco, M. (1992). The making of a drug-free America: Programs that work. New York, NY: Times
Books.

V. PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES

276

14. Legal Regulation of Addictive Substances and Addiction

Feinberg, J. (1984). Harm to others. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Feinberg, J. (1986). Harm to self. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Feinberg, J. (1988). Harmless wrongdoing. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Fingarette, H., & Hasse, A. (1979). Mental disabilities and criminal responsibility. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Global Commission on Drug Policy. (2011). War on drugs. Rio de Janeiro: Global
Commission on Drug Policy.
Heller v. Doe. (1993). 509 U.S. 312.
Heyman, G. (2009). Addiction: A disorder of choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Husak, D. (1992). Drugs and rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Husak, D. (2002). Legalize this! The case for decriminalizing drugs. London; New York, NY: Verso.
Husak, D. (2008). Overcriminalization: The limits of the criminal law. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Hyman, S. E. (2007). The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of
behavior. American Journal of Bioethics, 7, 8–11.
Jacobs, J. B. (1990). Imagining drug legalization. The Public Interest, 101, 28–42.
Kalant, H. (2010). What neurobiology cannot tell us about addiction. Addiction, 105,
780–789.
Kleiman, M. (1992). Against excess: Drug policy for results. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Levy, N. (2011). Addiction, responsibility and ego depletion. In J. Poland & G. Graham
(Eds.), Addiction and responsibility (pp. 89–112). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
MacCoun, R., & Reuter, P. (2001). Drug war heresies: Learning from other vices, times and places.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Monahan, J., Steadman, H., Silver, E., Appelbaum, P., Robbins, P., & Mulvey, E., et al. (2001).
Rethinking risk assessment: The MacArthur study of mental disorder and violence. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press.
Montana v. Egelhoff. (1996). 518 U.S. 37.
Moore, M. H. (1991). Drugs, the criminal law, and the administration of justice. Milbank
Quarterly, 69, 529–560.
Morse, S. (2000). Hooked on hype: Addiction and responsibility. Law and Philosophy, 19, 3–49.
Morse, S. (2003). Diminished rationality, diminished responsibility. Ohio State Journal of
Criminal Law, 1, 289–308.
Morse, S. (2007). Voluntary control of behavior and responsibility. American Journal of
Bioethics, 7, 12.
Morse, S. (2009). Addiction, science and criminal responsibility. In N. Farahany (Ed.), The impact
of behavioral sciences on criminal law (pp. 241–288). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Morse, S. (2011). Addiction and criminal responsibility. In J. Poland & G. Graham (Eds.),
Addiction and responsibility (pp. 159–199). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nadelmann, E. A. (1989). Drug prohibition in the United States: Costs, consequences, and
alternatives. Science, 245, 939–947.
Nolan, J. (Ed.). (2002). Drug courts in theory and in practice. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruter.
Parry, J. (2010). Civil mental disability law, evidence and testimony: A comprehensive reference manual
for lawyers, judges and mental disability professionals. Chicago, IL: American Bar Association.
Powell v. Texas. (1968). 393 U.S. 514.
Robinson v. California. (1962). 370 U.S. 660.
United States v. Moore. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Wilson, J. Q. (1990). Against the legalization of drugs. Commentary, 89(2), 21–28.
Yaffe, G. (2011). Lowering the bar for addicts. In J. Poland & G. Graham (Eds.), Addiction
and responsibility (pp. 113–138). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zimring, F., & Hawkins, G. (1992). The search for rational drug control. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Zinberg, N. (1986). Drug, set and setting: The basis for controlled intoxicant use. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.

V. PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES

